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Abstract: The global financial crisis outbreak after 2007 has profoundly changed the course of the 
history of relations in the world economy, creating a complicated framework of political relations 
between countries and economic regions. In this context, it is important to depict the economic 
convergence stage of Euro Area candidate countries and to what extent this crisis has or has not changed 
the euro adoption objective for these countries. The present paper aimed to shed a light on this issue by 
analyzing both the state of the convergence process and the public attitude regarding euro adoption in 
four Euro Area candidate countries which have the same monetary policy strategy (inflation targeting). 
The research results show the way in which the global financial crisis “deviates” the convergence 
trajectory of the nominal indicators, but also the political and public sentiment against the euro adoption 
in the selected countries. The results represent a valuable groundwork for analyzing the way in which 
National Central Banks candidate to the Eurosystem are implied into the processing for euro adoption 
during turbulence times 
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1 Introduction 
Since the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union, decision-makers 
from member states of the Euro Area considered that a single currency will promote 
economic and political convergence between countries (Pop et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, the experience of more than fifteen years shows a very convoluted path 
of monetary integration in Europe. The internal problems of Euro Area have been 
seen in time, but they have worsened with the European financial crisis outburst, 
Lehman Brothers collapse being the major shock which generated a series of 
challenges, including those related to the continuity of the European project (Lupu 
& Criste, 2013). 
After joining the European Union, the Central and Eastern European countries are 
expected to enter the last stage of Economic and Monetary Union. The first of them, 
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Slovenia, have adopted the single currency in a different period (before the global 
financial crisis outbreak), and Slovakia, immediately after the Lehman Brothers 
shock. For these countries, euro adoption condition were different (see Criste, 2012) 
than for the countries which are still candidate countries to the Euro Area. Although 
the global financial crisis hindered the economies of the Baltic States, they kept up 
to adopt the euro currency; so that all the three are already member states of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (Lithuania became recently the 19th member state 
of Euro Area). The remaining countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania) are still on their way to becoming members of this 
monetary union. 
Although the formal condition for entering Euro Area is the fulfilment of the nominal 
convergence criteria, being stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, these conditions have 
not ensured a viable monetary integration in the Euro Area (Pop et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, the economic convergence process is not an irreversible one, and the 
developments of the macroeconomic indicators playing the role of nominal 
convergence conditions must be related to the trends of the real economy. Even 
though there are such limitations, the nominal convergence remains a precondition 
for euro adoption and thus it is necessary to be taken into account as a starting point 
in evaluating the economic convergence process of the European Union countries. 
The analysis of the economic convergence offers useful insights, but it could not 
explain the strategy of euro adoption for the candidate countries to the Economic and 
Monetary Union. In this context, Dandashly and Verdun (2011) explain that the 
process for euro adoption include not only a cost-benefit analysis, but also a political 
one. By the same token, Dyson (2006), Johnson (2008), and Greskovits (2008), 
assess the euro adoption process taking into account some political criteria such as: 
the policy learning, the transfer of ideas and knowledge among central bankers, the 
adjustment to the global pressures and to the Europeanization current, and they 
conclude that the political features plays an important role in influencing the euro 
adoption strategy. 
Analysing the situation of three of the candidate countries to the Euro Area, namely 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, Dandashly and Verdun (2011) argue that the 
euro adoption timing depend on the domestic politics climate. This climate is defined 
by the domestic problems and the internal conflicts between public institutions 
(central bank vs. government) and their visions regarding the European project (euro 
sceptical view vs. euro enthusiastic view). 
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2. Methodology and Data 
The euro adoption process represents the two sides of the same coin, because it 
implies on the one hand, an economic analysis for evaluating the convergence 
process (not only the nominal convergence as a precondition imposed by the 
Maastricht Treaty, but also a sustainable convergence of the real economy) and on 
the other side, the political preferences. Our analyses resumed to the European 
emerging countries candidate to the Euro Area which have some common features: 
they have a similar strategy of monetary policy (inflation targeting), they have a 
flexible exchange rate and they do not yet enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism II: 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. We firstly evaluate the nominal 
convergence stage and secondly, the domestic climate concerning political 
preferences and public opinion for euro adoption. 
Table 2. The nominal convergence criteria 
Criterion Price stability 
Sound 
public 
finances 
Sustainable 
public 
finances 
Durability of 
convergence 
Exchange rate 
stability 
Indicator HIPC inflation 
rate 
Governmen
t deficit as 
% of GDP 
Government 
debt as % of 
GDP 
Long-term 
interest rate 
Deviation from a 
central rate 
Condition of 
nominal 
convergence 
Not more than 
the reference 
value, as the 
rate of the three 
best 
performing 
Member States 
plus 1.5 pp. 
Not more 
than the 
reference 
value (3%) 
Not more 
than the 
reference 
value (60%) 
Not more than 
the reference 
value, as the rate 
of the three best 
performing 
Member States in 
terms of price 
stability plus 2 
pp.  
Participation in 
ERM II for at 
least 2 years 
without severe 
tensions 
Source: European Commission 
In order to spotlight the changes induced by the global financial crisis regarding the 
euro adoption process in the selected countries, we analyze the stage of the nominal 
convergence, as an initial condition for euro adoption (the nominal convergence 
criteria are presented in Table 1) and the attitude of both the citizens and political 
class concerning the euro adoption in the selected countries. For that purpose, we 
take into consideration an extended period of time (2004-2014), with Lehman 
Brothers shock as benchmark for starting the European episode of the global 
financial crisis. We use Eurostat data for nominal convergence indicators, Flash 
Eurobarometer surveys and Annual Reports of National Central Banks to extract 
information regarding the public opinion and the political decisions. 
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3. Results 
3.1 . The State of the Nominal Convergence 
As it is shown in Figure 1, the reference rate for HICP inflation decreases 
significantly after Lehman Brothers shock, but the selected countries were at grips 
with this indicator, especially Romania and Hungary. After 2012, it is remarked a 
convergence of HICP inflation rates for all these four countries. 
 
Figure 1. The HICP inflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania 
(12-months’ average of yearly rates, %) 
Source: Eurostat data, author’s calculations 
The inflationary pressure has been diminishing since 2009, not as a direct and 
exclusive effect of the global financial crisis manifestation, but as a result of the 
Central Banks pursuing of the price stability as their primary objective. One of the 
main reasons refers to National Banks’ aiming at forming and maintaining lower 
levels of the inflation expectations, during that period. 
As concerns the long term interest rate criterion, since 2006, Romania and Hungary 
registered the highest levels and exceeded the most frequently the reference level: 
Hungary exceeded seven times, and Romania, six times. As it is depicted in Figure 
2, all four countries meet the interest rate criterion in the last two years (in 2013 and 
2014). 
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Figure 2. The long-term interest rate in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania (average yields for 10 years government bonds, %) 
Source: Eurostat data, author’s calculations 
The global financial crisis put pressure on the fiscal criteria of the nominal 
convergence, as the general public deficits have worsened in 2009 (see Figure 3), 
and the public debt increased at a faster pace during 2008-2011 (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 3. The general public deficit in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania (as % of GDP) 
Source: Eurostat data 
In 2009-2010, the effects of the global financial crisis were reflected by the huge 
rates of this indicator in all countries, Romania and Poland being in the worse 
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position. Nevertheless, in recent years, after 2011, there is a tendency for improving 
of this indicator in these countries, except Poland which is in the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, since 2009. Measures taken by the Polish Government are expected to 
reduce the nominal deficit in 2015 to 2.5% of GDP, below target recommended by 
the European Council (2.8% of GDP). 
 
Figure 4 The public debt in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania (as % 
of GDP) 
Source: Eurostat data (for 2004-2013); Ameco data (for 2014) 
Concerning the public deficit, Hungary attained the highest levels of this indicator, 
even before the global financial crisis outbreak, exceeding constantly the reference 
value (60% of GDP), since 2005. Although the other three countries meet this 
criterion, the public debt has increased more pronounced during 2008-2013. 
None of the four countries participated in the ERM II, but analysing the potential 
fluctuations of the national currencies, we can assess if the exchange rate 
developments of the national currencies are enrolled in the admissible band of 
fluctuation (±15%). As it is depicted in the left panel of the Figure 5, national 
currencies of Poland, Hungary and Romania exceeded the admissible band, during 
2008-2009, but after 2013, all the four currencies had stable evolutions, so that the 
exchange rate criterion should be currently considered fulfilled. 
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Figure 5. Spread of the exchange rate fluctuations for Euro Area candidate countries 
Source: Eurostat data, author’s calculations 
Note: We consider a two-year period (the minimum period for participating in the ERM II) 
in order to evaluate the exchange rate fluctuations of the four national currencies against 
the euro. Because it is not officially announced any central parity for the four national 
currencies exchange rates, we take as benchmark the monthly average exchange rate level 
of the previous month of the reference period (i.e. for January 2008-December 20109, we 
consider the exchange rate level of December 2007; for March 2013-February 2015, we 
consider the exchange rate level of February 2013). 
During March 2013 - February 2015, the Czech koruna (CZK) has a larger 
depreciation than the other currencies and this is explained by the new “framework” 
of the monetary policy choosing to use the currency exchange rate as an additional 
monetary instrument, as the policy interest rate was already at the zero lower bound. 
Thus, in November 2013, the Czech National Bank Board decided to depreciate the 
koruna by 4.5%, pursuing to prevent the nominal appreciation under the level of 27 
CZK/EUR.  
As a general observation of this section of the paper, we can underline that the 
candidate countries have recently improved the nominal convergence path, although 
Hungary continue to be in a vulnerable position relative to the public debt (see Table 
2). 
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Table 2. The nominal convergence gap1) in 2008 and 2014 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on Eurostat data. 
Notes: 1) The nominal convergence gap is calculated as the difference between the reference 
value and the value recorded for each indicator and in each country; 2) The positive values 
show the excessive levels against the reference value (failure criterion - marked with dark-
grey colour); 3) The positive values show the fulfilment of the Maastricht criterion (marked 
with light-grey colour), and the negative ones show the excessive levels to the limit imposed; 
4) The positive values means excessive levels to the limit imposed (marked with dark-grey 
colour), and the negative ones denote a lower level of public debt than the Maastricht limit; 
5) The exchange rate fluctuation of the national currency against euro is calculated 
according to the methodology described above (the note of the Chart 5). We marked with 
light-grey colour, if the exchange rate values are within the ±15% limits, and with dark-grey 
colour, if the exchange rate values exceed those limits. 
 
3.2 . Opinions Regarding the Euro Adoption 
The effects induced by the global financial crisis on the Euro Area periphery 
(namely, on the economies of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland) amplifies the fears 
related to the potential risks of euro adoption in the candidate countries. In fact, the 
global financial crisis changed the balance between the cost and benefits of euro 
adoption, enhancing the first ones (costs) and blurring the latter ones (benefits), not 
only because of the economic and financial vulnerabilities of some member states, 
but also because of the Euro Area project itself, which is an unfinished project.  
Annual Reports of the National Banks from these countries highlight that the euro 
adoption strategy was one of the main objectives before the global financial crisis 
outbreak, but the challenges emerged from the new context, after September 2008, 
have changed the priorities of the national authorities, including the timing for euro 
adoption. 
Based on the National Convergence Programs and Annual Reports of National 
Banks from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, we find that the 
initial target date for euro adoption was pushed forward in an uncertain future (see 
Table 3). 
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Table 3. The target dates for joining the Euro Area have changed in time 
Country 
The last date for euro 
adoption before the 
global financial crisis 
During the global financial 
crisis 
Currently statements 
for euro adoption 
Czech 
Republic 
2009-2010 - according 
to The Czech 
Republic’s Euro-area 
Accession Strategy 
(2003) 
In July 2010, the new Czech 
government decided not to fix 
the date for euro adoption 
Not a target date 
Hungary 2008 - according to the 
Official euro adoption 
strategy (August, 2003) 
2010 - according to the 
first Convergence 
Programme (May 
2004) 
In 2009, the target date has 
been postponed again and 
analysts estimate an adoption 
of the euro by 2014 
Not a target date 
Poland 2008/2009 - according 
to the Economic Pre-
aderation Programme 
(2003) 
The Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk announced in 
December 2008 that Poland 
should strive to adopt the euro 
as early as 2012  
Not a target date 
 
 
Romania 2014 according to the 
Convergence 
Programme (2004)  
 
 
According to its Annual 
Report 2009, the National 
Bank of Romania assessments 
indicated 2012 as a desirable 
moment for entering in ERM II 
(1 January 2015 - the new 
target date for euro adoption) 
1 January 2019 is a 
proposed target date by 
the Government within 
the Convergence 
Programme 2014-2017 
Source: Author’s representation based on the National Convergence Programs and Annual 
Reports of the National Banks of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania 
At the political level, these four countries have different approaches regarding the 
target date for euro adoption. While the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland use 
the “wait and see” approach, Romania has already set a target date for euro adoption. 
Although Romania has a target date and a National Co-ordinator institution, it has 
not yet a National Euro Changeover Plan, like the other three countries. Furthermore, 
the Czech Republic and Poland have a more advanced path concerning the technical 
preparation for euro adoption. Beside the National Co-ordinator institution for euro 
adoption (since 2005) and the National Changeover Plan for euro (since 2007), the 
Czech Republic has an updated national strategy for Euro-area Accession (since 
2007). In December 2014, the Czech government approved a joint document of the 
Ministry of Finance and the Czech National Bank regarding the assessment of the 
fulfillment of the nominal and real convergence of the Czech Republic with the Euro 
Area. Poland has also a National Euro Changeover Plan (since 2010), a national 
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strategy for Poland integration with the Euro Area. Recently (in November 2014) the 
National Bank of Poland released a document regarding the economic challenges of 
Poland’s integration with the Euro Area. 
However, central banks, including the National Bank of Romania, are more reluctant 
to a rapid euro adoption, highlighting the importance of both the sustainable 
economic convergence and the political and social consensus. Like the other central 
banks candidate to the Eurosystem, the National Bank of Hungary has a major role 
in monitoring the convergence process of the euro adoption by publishing regularly 
a Convergence Report. Nevertheless, in the recent years, it seems that the interest for 
this subject is decreasing, because the last Report was published in 2011. It contains 
a detailed analysis related to the risks and benefits of introducing the euro in 
Hungary. The Czech National Bank remains reluctant to set a target date, but this 
reluctance has increased in the recent years as a result of both the Euro Area 
sovereign debt crisis, and the political instability between the “periphery” and the 
“core” countries. The same attitude is seen in case of the National Bank of Poland, 
which considers that the Euro Area unsolved internal problems represent a major 
hedge for a future integration of Poland in the Euro Area. 
Furthermore, the debates on the early entry of the Czech Republic into Euro Area 
have recently showed a cleavage between the Ministry of Finance and the Czech 
National Bank, on the one side, and the Presidency, on the other side. The first ones 
don’t agree with the idea to adopt the euro until at least 2018, while the president 
and the prime minister want an early adoption of euro. In the same situation, the euro 
adoption objective became a subject for election campaign in Poland. The conflictive 
situation in the domestic field amplifies the already precariously conditions for the 
future of Euro Area enlargement. 
The public opinion regarding euro adoption in the selected countries is based on the 
official data of the Flash Eurobarometer Report (June 2014).  
As the Figure 6 shows, these opinions differ among citizens from the four countries, 
both during or immediate after the EU accession (2007) and after the global financial 
crisis (2014). Comparing those two moments, there is a downward trend for Czech 
Republic, Poland and Romania regarding the proportion of people which are in 
favour of the single currency. Nevertheless, Hungary has maintained a constant level 
(50%) in this regard. The most obvious falling of this level is registered by the Czech 
Republic (from almost 50% to 26%), Czechs being the most attached to their national 
currency. On the opposite side is Romania and Hungary, which maintained higher 
levels in terms of percentage of responders in favour of euro adoption. Although 
these results show that the euro is viewed by the citizens of Romania and Hungary 
as providing a greater protection, it is important for national authorities to inform 
people not only about the potential benefits of euro adoption, but also about the 
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potential risks generated by giving up to an important shock absorption instrument 
and by a “too hasty” euro adoption. 
 
Figure 6. Changing the public opinion regarding the euro adoption Euro Area 
candidate countries (the proportion of the questioned people who see positive 
consequences of euro adoption at the national level) 
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 400 Report, June 2014 
The same Report highlights that the public opinion of these countries views 
differently the timing for euro adoption. Hence, Romania has the highest percentage 
of questioned people (44%, in 2014) who are in favour of joining the euro as soon 
as possible. On the opposite side is the Czech Republic, with the lowest level (6%, 
in 2014), followed by Poland (11%) and Hungary (22%). 
 
4. Conclusion 
One of the general conclusions arisen from our analysis refers to the uncertainty of 
euro adoption as main objective for these four countries, as the global financial crisis 
changed their national priorities. During the analysed period, the path of euro 
adoption has changed. Before the Lehman Brothers shock, the target date for euro 
adoption was very challenging in these four countries, in spite of the undeveloped 
stage of some Maastricht criteria fulfilment, at that moment. Conversely, after 2009, 
the nominal convergence attains an advanced stage in these countries, but the attitude 
regarding the euro adoption becomes more prudent, as the global financial crisis 
effects reveal a more complex area of costs concomitant with a reduced area of 
benefits for joining the Euro Area. The subject of this paper could be developed by 
including indicators which describe the real convergence of these countries with the 
Euro Area, as it could depict new features. We also notice that there is no relation 
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between public opinion and the fulfilment of the nominal convergence criteria. 
Although the Czech Republic meets all five criteria, the public opinion is the most 
unfavourable to the euro as a national currency. Instead, Hungary has some problem 
with the public debt, but the public attitude towards euro adoption is more 
enthusiastic. In the near future, the euro adoption process in the selected countries 
remains a conflictive subject at the national level. In spite of the economic (nominal) 
convergence tendency, there is a political divergence between national authorities. 
From the political point of view, an important objective for the decision-makers is 
to increase the awareness and to enhance the knowledge of the public concerning the 
often intricate issues of participation in Monetary Union highlighting not only the 
benefit, but also the potential risks emerging from the decision to abandon the 
national currency. 
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